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INTRODUCTION

The most significant development in the substantive criminal law of Tennessee in 1974' involved enactment of a mandatory
death penalty statute,2 prompted by a desire to provide for the
death penalty in a constitutionally acceptable fashion. 3 The most
notable procedural development during the past year was the
decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in McKeldin v. State,,
extending the accused's right to counsel to preliminary hearings.'
1. This survey encompasses state and federal decisions reported in the National
Reporter System during the calendar year 1974.
Frequent reference will be made to previous surveys by the author. The complete
citations for these surveys are as follows: CriminalLaw in Tennessee in 1973: A Critical
Survey, 41 TENN. L. REv. 203 (1974); Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1972: A Critical
Survey, 40 TENN. L. REv. 569 (1973); Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1971: A Critical
Survey, 39 TENN. L. REv. 247 (1972); Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1970: A Critical
Survey, 38 TENN. L. Rav. 182 (1971); Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1969: A Critical
Survey, 37 TENN. L. REV. 433 (1970); Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1968: A Critical
Survey, 36 TENN. L. REv. 221 (1969). Hereinafter these surveys will be cited as follows:
1973 Survey; 1972 Survey; 1971 Survey; 1970 Survey; 1969 Survey; 1968 Survey.
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2406 (Supp. 1974).
3. See text accompanying notes 11-29 infra.
4. 516 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1974).
5. See text accompanying notes 197-204 infra.
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Significant decisions by the United States Supreme Court
during 1974 presented further elaboration upon the subject of
obscenity' and the scope of cross-examination protected by the
right of confrontation.7 In addition, the court extended the authority to search vehicles without a warrant' and limited the constitutional right to counsel on appeal to a first appeal.9 Finally,
the Court applied by analogy the constitutional limitation on
increased punishment after a retrial by prohibiting the bringing
of more serious charges against an accused seeking de novo appeal. 10
II.

A.

OFFENSES

Against Person
1.
a.

Homicide
Murder

By its action in the 1972 decision of Furman v. Georgia," the
United States Supreme Court effectively eliminated the death
penalty as a constitutionally permissible form of punishment, at
least as then employed throughout the country. Furman is at best
a thin precedent since the Court split five to four, with each of
the nine Justices writing a separate opinion. The four dissenting
Justices were prepared to sustain the death penalty as it was then
being imposed,"2 and only two Justices on the prevailing side
found the death penalty unconstitutional per se. 13 It was thus
apparent, theoretically at least, that if the objections of but one
of the three remaining Justices on the prevailing side 4 could be
satisfied, the death penalty could be reinstated. From the legislative perspective, the point of least resistance appeared to be
the view entertained, if not unequivocally advocated, by those
three Justices: a mandatory death penalty following a determi6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See text accompanying notes 71-78 infra.
See text accompanying notes 177-89 infra.
See text accompanying notes 137-60 infra.
See text accompanying notes 205-11 infra.
See text accompanying notes 254-65 infra.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.
Justices Brennan and Marshall.
Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White.
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nation of guilt for a particular offense would eliminate discriminatory and capricious imposition of the punishment. 5 Several
8 and
states quickly enacted mandatory death penalty statutes,"
7
a number of courts have sustained them.1
Tennessee joined these ranks by enacting a mandatory death
penalty statute for first degree murder," but only after amending
the statutory definition of first degree murder so as to modify
what had been essentially a codification of the common law. 9 The
amended statute designates four categories of first degree murder:2 0
15. It is questionable whether this in fact will be the result of a mandatory death
penalty. While previously jurors may have capriciously and invidiously imposed the death
penalty, if the death penalty is made mandatory for first degree murder, for example,
juries may just as capriciously return verdicts of first or second degree murder (where the
evidence will support the former) according to their predisposition toward punishment in
the particular case.
16. See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty
Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1690, 1691 n.6 (1974), which cites statutes in twenty-six states.
17. State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761 (Del. 1972); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1973); State v. Hill, 297 So. 2d 660 (La. 1974); State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d
19 (1973); State v. Johnson, 31 Ohio St. 2d 106, 285 N.E.2d 751 (1972) (dicta); Jefferson
v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 747, 204 S.E.2d 258 (1974); State v. Baker, 87 Wash. 2d 281,
501 P.2d 284 (1972). More sophisticated is the Georgia response, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 272534.1 to -2537 (Supp. 1974), sustained in Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 204 S.E.2d 612
(1974). In that case the court stated:
Georgia's new statutory scheme is designed to accomplish the following
objectives to meet the U.S. Supreme Court's concern with arbitrariness. First,
the new statute substantially narrows and guides the discretion of the sentencing authority to impose the death penalty and allows it only for the most outrageous crimes and those offenses against persons who place themselves in great
danger as public servants. In addition, the new statute provides for automatic
and swift appellate review to insure that the death penalty will not be carried
out unless the evidence supports the finding of one of the serious crimes specified
in the statute. The statute also requires comparative sentencing so that if the
death penalty is only rarely imposed for an act or it is substantially out of line
with sentences imposed for other acts it will be set aside as excessive. And,
finally, the statute requires this court to make certain the record does not indicate that arbitrariness or discrimination was used in the imposition of the death
sentence.
These standards in the new Georgia Statute meet the criticism expressed
by a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Furman and Jackson decision
[sic].
Id. at -,
204 S.E.2d at 616.
18. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2406 (Supp. 1974).
19. The statute as amended in 1973 was declared unconstitutional under the state
constitution in State v. Hailey, 505 S.W.2d 712 (Tenn. 1974), but was thereafter reenacted in proper form and now appears in TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402 (Supp. 1974).
20. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402 (Supp. 1974).
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An individual commits murder in the first degree if:
(1) he commits a willful, deliberate, malicious and
premeditated killing or murder;
(2) he commits a willful, deliberate, and malicious killing
or murder, and:
(a) the victim is an employee of the department of
correction having custody of the actor,
(b) the victim is a prison inmate in custody with the
actor,
(c) the victim is known to the actor to be a peace
officer or fireman acting in the course of his employment,
(d) the victim is a judge acting in the course of his
judicial duties,
(e) the victim is a popularly elected public official,
(f) the offense is committed for hire; or,
(g) the offense is committed while attempting to
evade law enforcement officials;"
(3) he hires another to commit a willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing or murder, and such hiring
causes the death of the victim;" or
(4) he commits a willful, deliberate and malicious killing
or murder during the perpetration of any arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful
throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or
bomb.
All other murders-that is, malicious killings not described
within these designated categories-are denominated second degree murder,23 now punishable by incarceration for ten years to
life.24
Deleted from the former statutory definition of first degree
murder are two seldom used common law bases of the offense-poisoning and lying in wait. The first category of the new
statute is the most frequently employed verbalization of the com-

21. In some instances-a killing for hire, for example-it would be a rare case in
which premeditation would not be present.
Three of the subcategories in the amended statute are taken from the Tenn. Crim.
Code and Code of Crim. Proc. § 39-1105 (Proposed Final Draft, Nov. 1973) [hereinafter
referred to as Proposed Criminal Code]: the victim as prison employee, the victim as
peace officer, and the killing for hire.
22. This provision also is included in section 39-1105 of the Proposed Criminal Code.
23. TSNN. CODE ANN. § 39-2403 (1955).
24. Id. § 39-2408 (Supp. 1974).
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mon law definition of murder. The second category may well raise
questions of capriciousness in the presumption that the killing of
persons fulfilling certain public roles is inherently more serious
than other murders, and thus deserving of greater punishment.
The implication appears to be that certain lives are more valuable to society than others, a disturbing and perhaps constitutionally dubious presumption. 5 The third category appears wholly
superfluous. In the situation described in that category, the principal is clearly chargeable under the second category of the statute with first degree murder, and the party hiring the principal
is an accessory before the fact. Because accessories before the fact
are chargeable with the same offense as the principal in Tennessee,26 the hiring party would be chargeable with first degree murder even absent the third category of the statutory definition. The
fourth category is a recodification of the felony-murder rule but
differs from its predecessor in several respects: first, in the designation of the included felonies;2 second, in the requirement
of actual perpetration, rather than the mere attempt to perpetrate the felony;2 and third, in requiring proof of willfulness
and deliberation. The prior statute followed the common law
felony-murder rule which did not require proof of premeditation,
deliberation, and willfulness. Such elements were assumed to be
29
implicit in the felonious conduct.
b.

Manslaughter

The interrelationship of premeditation, which will raise a
25. The definition goes far beyond the frequently heard argument that the death
penalty is the only meaningful sanction imposable upon an inmate serving a life sentence
without the possibility of parole. Insofar as prison killings are concerned, the statute
encompasses any inmate.
26. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-108 (1955). However, under TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2407
(1955), if the principal has not been convicted, the punishment is life imprisonment.
Ironically, after the abolition of the death penalty, this was a more severe punishment
than that previously authorized for the principal (20 years to life). Ch. 23, § 4, [1829]
Tenn. Pub. Acts 28 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2405 (1955)), as amended, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-2405 (Supp. 1974).
27. The previous statute encompassed first degree murder, rape, larceny, burglary,
arson, and robbery. Section 39-1105 of the Proposed Criminal Code is limited to kidnapping, aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and burglary.
28. Section 39-1105 of the Proposed Criminal Code encompasses "an attempt to
commit during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission
of the offense."
29. Proof of malice is independently required in all cases of murder. See TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-2401 (1955).

1975]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

homicide charge to first degree murder, and provocation, which
will reduce the offense from murder to voluntary manslaughter,
arose in Baxter v. State,3" a case decided by the Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals. The defendant, under the apparently mistaken belief that the victim was having an affair with his wife,
went to the city dump where the victim was operating a bulldozer
and proceeded to shoot him four times with a single barrel shotgun. The majority had no difficulty in finding premeditation and
concluded that "if premeditation exists, it is immaterial that the
' 3
defendant was in a passion when that design was executed. '
The use of the term "passion" in the court's statement is
ambiguous. If the court is merely saying that first degree murder
may be perpetrated by a person in an emotional state, it is quite
correct. If, on the other hand, it is suggesting that once premeditation has been formed, a homicide never can be committed "in
the heat of passion," as the phrase is defined by the common
law,3" the pronouncement is far more questionable. Although initially the defendant may have premeditated a murder, it is conceivable that in the final analysis the actual killing was precipitated by an emotional state aroused by an assault by the victim
or by unexpectedly finding the victim engaged in sexual relations with the defendant's wife. In either case the killing would
be the result of a situation wholly unanticipated at the time the
premeditation was formed.
In support of its conclusion in Baxter, the court cited Presley
v. State,3 3 a decision by the Tennessee Supreme Court, in which
the same statement regarding premeditation and passion was
made. Perhaps the holding in both these cases may be explained
on the basis of the absence of an act arousing defendant's passion
at the time of the killing. Support for this interpretation is suggested by the fact that Presley cited Leonard v. State34 as authority for its holding. In Leonard the Tennessee Supreme Court
more accurately observed that the question is "whether, if such
provocation and passion existed, the homicide was the result of
30.
31.
32.
unlawful
heat ....
33.
34.

503 S.W.2d 226 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
Id. at 229 (citation omitted).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2409 (1955) describes voluntary manslaughter as "the
killing of another without malice, either express or implied . . . upon a sudden
"
161 Tenn. 310, 30 S.W.2d 231 (1930).
155 Tenn. 325, 292 S.W. 849 (1927).
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such passion or of the previously settled purpose . . . to do the
35
deed."
The potential problem posed by the Baxter court's treatment
of the relationship between premeditation and provocation is further complicated by the fact that in Tennessee, by virtue of
5
Whitsett v. State,"
the defense of provocation by marital infidelity does not require that the accused see the parties together at
all.3" Thus, in his dissent in Baxter, Judge Galbreath argued that
a first degree murder conviction had never been sustained in a
factually comparable case in Tennessee and that the majority's
holding was irreconcilable with Whitsett.3 1 If this analysis is
correct, Baxter may be read as impliedly overruling Whitsett, a
not entirely unattractive development. Alternatively, Whitsett
may be viewed as not so much a homicide precedent as a mental
impairment precedent, holding that a heat of passion may be
aggravated and sustained by a mental impairment short of insan3
ity, which will have the effect of mitigating the offense.
35. Id. at 338, 292 S.W. at 853.
36. 201 Tenn. 317, 299 S.W.2d 2 (1957).
37. "[Unexpectedly he met the debaucher of his wife and destroyer of his home
within an hour after he had received information correctly convincing him of that fact."
Id. at 327, 299 S.W.2d at 7.
38. A rather diligent search of the compiled decisions of our Supreme
Court has failed to uncover a single opinion in which a slaying prompted by the
jealous passion aroused by a firm conviction on the part of a husband that
another man has debauched his wife has been held to be murder in the first
degree. The suppressed frustration and resentment that naturally arises in the
mind of a husband whose wife has been sexually active with another man is too
well known to warrant elaborate discourse. That his powerful emotion may not
subside even after days of worry and mental turmoil is also recognized. Thus it
sometimes occurs that after days and nights of brooding, reflection and unsuccessful efforts to overcome the violence that is locked up inside, the reason is
overcome and tragedy results.
The fact that the defendant appeared calm to witnesses who saw him before
the shooting does not dispel the fact that in all likelihood he was, and had been
for days, working himself up to the ultimate frenzy of jealousy that motivated
his final outburst. This very appearance of calm and the effort to hide the real
emotion has long been recognized as much worse than would be outbursts of
vocal rage accompanied by crying and threats against the object of passion,
others or himself. Shakespeare was right, as students of the emotion know, when
he advised, "Give sorrow words. The grief that does not speak whispers the o'er
burdened heart and bids it break."
503 S.W.2d at 232.
39. Interestingly, viewed in this perspective, Whitsett is as equally an aberrational
decision when compared with cases discussing a mental impairment defense as when
placed in the context of the law of homicide. See, e.g., McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442,
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In another decision concerning provocation and voluntary
manslaughter, State v. Tilson,10 the Tennessee Supreme Court
held that provocation may reduce a homicide from murder to
voluntary manslaughter only when the victim was the source of
the provocation. Although it appears that this issue had not previously arisen in Tennessee, the holding is consistent with the
common law.4 In Howard v. State2 the court of criminal appeals
held that because voluntary manslaughter is considered a lesser
included offense of murder, evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction of murder would be sufficient to sustain a conviction of
voluntary manslaughter, even though the crime was not committed in the heat of passion.
While malice necessary for a murder conviction may be presumed from the use of a deadly weapon, 3 the presumption is a
rebuttable one. In Lay v. State" the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals concluded that the presumption was rebutted where the
defendant, a blind man, shot at what he took to be an intruder
in his home in the middle of the night. The court did find, however, that the blindness of the defendant would not justify a lesser
standard of caution than that required of a sighted person and
thus found the defendant "guilty of a degree of culpable
negligence which sustains a conviction of an attempt to commit
voluntary manslaughter."45 The conclusion is puzzling for two
reasons. First, while involuntary manslaughter may be based on
a negligent act," voluntary manslaughter requires proof of an
express or implied intent to kill, a standard which seems to require more than "culpable negligence." 7 Second, irrespective of
the mens rea required for actual commission of an offense, an
242 S.W. 883 (1921); Watson v. State, 133 Tenn. 198, 180 S.W. 168 (1915).
40. 503 S.W.2d 921 (Tenn. 1974).
41. See 1 WHRTON's CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 276, at 585 n.11 (R. Anderson
ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON].
42. 506 S.W.2d 951 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973). The court cited Reagan v. State, 155
Tenn. 397, 293 S.W. 755 (1926), as authority for its holding.
43. See, e.g., Sharp v. State, 513 S.W.2d 189 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974); Gunn v.
State, 487 S.W.2d 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972); Bailey v. State, 479 S.W.2d 829 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1972).
44. 501 S.W.2d 820 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
45. Id. at 825 (emphasis added).
46. See Smith v. State, 212 Tenn. 510, 370 S.W.2d 543 (1963); Roe v. State, 210
Tenn. 282, 358 S.W.2d 308 (1962); see also 1 WHMRTON § 290.
47. See Manier v. State, 65 Tenn. (6 Baxter) 595 (1872); see also 1 WHARTON § 274.
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attempt to perpetrate the same offense always requires specific
intent."
5 a conviction
In Cole v. State"
of involuntary manslaughter
was sustained by the court of criminal appeals when death resulted from a drag race in which one of the automobiles driven
by the defendants collided with the vehicle driven by the victim.
In an earlier decision, involving virtually identical facts, convictions of second degree murder were sustained by the Tennessee
Supreme Court.50
B.

Against Property
1. Larceny

When alternative statutes are equally applicable to a given
situation, a canon of statutory construction directs that the statute of more specific application to the facts should govern. 5' In
Carmon v. State2 the defendant was convicted of larceny upon
proof that he had stolen a telephone from a telephone booth. It
was argued by the defense that the accused could only be charged
under the statute prohibiting, inter alia, the injuring of telephone
lines and appliances, 53 a less serious offense than larceny. While
not denying that this statute could indeed encompass the conduct
of the accused, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, focusing upon the purposes of the statutes, affirmed the conviction.
The court observed that the purpose of the telephone statute was
merely to punish the disruption of communication while the larceny statute was enacted to punish the wrongful conversion of
property.
An essential element of the crime of larceny is an intent to
deprive the owner of his property permanently.5 4 This require48. There must be an intent to commit a specific crime to constitute an
attempt, even though the commission of the crime itself might not require such
a specific intent. Thus, although murder may be committed without a specific
intent to kill, as under the felony murder rule, there can be no attempt to
commit murder without a specific intent to kill.
1 WHARTON § 73, at 155-56 (footnotes omitted).
49. 512 S.W.2d 598 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
50. Stallard v. State, 209 Tenn. 13, 348 S.W.2d 489 (1961).
51. See 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5204, at 541-42
(3d ed. 1943).
52. 512 S.W.2d 595 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
53. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4533 (1974).
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ment has led to so-called "joy-riding" statutes, designed to cover
situations in which a vehicle is taken without permission of the
owner but later abandoned under circumstances indicating that
it is highly probable that it will be retrieved by or returned to the
owner. In Spencer v. State5 the Tennessee Supreme Court determined for the first time56 that the Tennessee "joy-riding" statute5 7
was a lesser included offense of larceny,58 and that the defendant
on trial for larceny was prejudiced by the failure of the trial judge
to include the "joy-riding" statutory option in his charge to the
9
jury .
2.

Fraudulent Breach of Trust

In Gaston v. State ° the defendant, a real estate broker, executed a contract for the sale of real property, under the terms of
which the seller agreed to pay off the balance remaining on the
real estate mortgage. The purchase price was paid to the
defendant, and the buyer received a warranty deed which indicated that the property was unencumbered. Instead of paying the
mortgage indebtedness on behalf of the seller, however, the defendant, without giving notice of the sale to the mortgage company, continued to pay monthly installments for a year and a
half, after which time the total balance due had been paid. The
defendant conceded that the indebtedness should have been
paid off at the time of closing but that he did not do so because
he was short of cash.
The appellate court affirmed a conviction for fraudulent
breach of trust.6 Unlike larceny, this offense does not require
proof of an intent to steal at the time of the taking or anytime
thereafter. It need only be shown that the defendant intended
See Fields v. State, 46 Tenn. (6 Coldwell) 431 (1869).
501 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1973).
Cf. Prince v. State, 220 Tenn. 587, 421 S.W.2d 627 (1967).
57. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-504 (1955).
58. The court cited the following cases: State v. Blotzer, 188 Neb. 143, 195 N.W.2d
199 (1972); State v. Eyle, 236 Ore. 199, 388 P.2d 110 (1963); Commonwealth v. Nace, 222
Pa. Super. 329, 295 A.2d 87 (1972).
59. The court viewed such a charge as mandatory under TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2518
(1955).
60. 506 S.W.2d 802 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
61. The conviction was based on a violation of TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4228 (1955).
The offense of fraudulent breach of trust is defined in TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4226 (1955).
54.
55.
56.
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fraudulently to appropriate the property of another to his own
use, an intent which was supported by the record in Gaston.2
C.

Public Offenses

1. Drug Offenses
The Tennessee Drug Control Act of 1971,63 which was sustained against constitutional challenge by the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals in Hilton v. State,6 4 exempts "casual exchanges" from its sale provisions. 5 The scope of this exception
was considered in State v. Helton,6 where the defendant had
been convicted of selling heroin. The evidence showed that the
defendant had purchased two packages of heroin for twenty-five
dollars. He took the packages home and approximately twenty
minutes later became sick from his first use of the purchased
drug, which had occurred at the time of the sale. Two days later,
he returned to the original seller with the two heroin packages,
intending to get his money back. Ultimately, the two packages
were exchanged for twenty dollars and two marijuana cigarettes.
The defendant was prosecuted on the basis of this transaction.
The prosecution contended that the "casual exchange" exception
was inapplicable whenever money is given in exchange for a controlled substance. Considering this interpretation too narrow, the
Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction.
The court reasoned that had the legislature wished the distinction
to be drawn in the terms advocated by the prosecution, it could
easily have done so. Furthermore, the language employed by the
62.

See also Switzer v. State, 213 Tenn. 671, 378 S.W.2d 760 (1964).

63.

TENN. CODE ANN.

64.

503 S.W.2d 951 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).

65.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 52-1408 to -1448 (Supp. 1974).
§ 52-1432(a)(2) (Supp. 1974) provides as follows:

It may be inferred from the amount of controlled substances possessed by
an offender, along with other relevant facts surrounding the arrest, that the
controlled substance or substances were possessed with the purpose of selling
or otherwise dispensing. It may be inferred from circumstances indicating a
casual exchange among individuals of a small amount of controlled substances
that the controlled substances so exchanged were possessed not with the purpose
of selling or otherwise dispensing them in violation of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section. Such inferences shall be transmitted to the jury by the
trial judge's charge and the jury will consider such inferences along with the
nature of the substance possessed when affixing the penalty.
See Smithson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
66. 507 S.W.2d 117 (Tenn. 1974).

1975]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

statute suggested to the court that a casual exchange was to be
determined by an examination of the relationship of the parties
to the transaction and not on the basis of the presence or absence
of a money exchange. In Helton there was evidence that the original seller was both an addict and a drug peddler, while the
defendant was neither. The defendant's sole purpose had been to
obtain a refund of his purchase money, having found the goods
unsatisfactory. The court was persuaded that these circumstances fell within the casual exchange exemption provided by the
Act.
2. Escape
7
the defendant was involved in a workIn Lacey v. State"
release program under which he held a job in a factory during the
day and returned to the state correctional facility each evening.
On Christmas he was given a pass for the day but failed to return
and was apprehended in a stolen automobile over a month later.
He was prosecuted under a statute" which at that time provided:
"If any inmate serving a term under the direct or indirect custody
and supervision of the department of correction, or other state
division or agency, shall escape or attempt to escape, he shall be
indicted for an escape . . . ." The defendant contended that
since he did not leave the correctional facility without permission,
he was not chargeable with the offense of escape. Subsequent to
the events upon which the charge was brought, the statute was
amended to include explicitly escapes occurring while an inmate
was "on furlough."6 The defendant argued that this subsequent
amendment indicated that such occurrences were not included in
the prior statute. The court of criminal appeals disagreed, citing
a Rhode Island decision 0 which on substantially identical facts,
held that the subsequent legislative act merely clarified the law.

3.

Obscenity

Two decisions were rendered by the United States Supreme
67. 506 S.W.2d 809 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
68. Ch. 38, § 29, [1829] Tenn. Pub. Acts 71, as amended, TENN. CODE ANN. § 393802 (Supp. 1974).
69. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3802 (Supp. 1974).
70. State v. Furlong, 110 R.I. 174, 291 A.2d 267 (1972). The court also cited State v.
Kiggins, 86 S.D. 612, 200 N.W.2d 243 (1972).
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Court during 1974 which sought to clarify the holdings of the
previous term in Miller v. California7 and its progeny." In overruling the finding by a trial court that the motion picture Carnal
Knowledge was obscene, the Court in Jenkins v. Georgia73 put to
rest any notion that the Miller decision had precluded all review
of jury determinations on obscenity. The Court concluded that
the film could not be found patently offensive under the Miller
test.
In Hamling v. United States7 the Court held that it had not
intended to stipulate any particular geographic unit by adopting
"contemporary community standards" for the obscenity test.
Rather, the intent was merely to permit jurors to rely upon their
own experience in making judgments. Generally, this would
mean experience gained in an area from which the jury was
drawn-for example, a federal district. Standards of a broader
community could be used, however. Miller, for instance, used the
State of California as the community from which to draw its
standard. The Court further observed in Hamling that a federal
district court could "admit evidence of standards existing in some
place outside of [its] particular district, if it felt such evidence
would assist the jury in the resolution of the issues which they
'
' 75
were to decide.
On the authority of the Miller decision the Tennessee obscenity statute7" was held unconstitutional in Art Theatre Guild, Inc.
v. State ex rel. Rhodes.77 A new obscenity statute 8 which codified
the definition of obscenity in Miller was promptly enacted.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
"utterly

413 U.S. 15 (1973).
See 1973 Survey at 219-21.
418 U.S. 153 (1974).
418 U.S. 87 (1974).
Id. at 106.
Ch. 91, § 2, [1965] Tenn. Pub. Acts 322 (repealed 1974).
510 S.W.2d 258 (Tenn. 1974). The court condemned both the statutory phrase
without social importance" and the absence from the statute of specifically described sexual conduct. While the latter is compelled by Miller, the former is not constitutionally objectionable. The language of the statute, derived from Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), merely states a narrower test for obscenity-an option available

to the state.
78. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3010 to -3022 (Supp. 1974).
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I.
A.

PARTIES

Accessory Before the Fact

An accessory before the fact is considered to be as culpable
as the principal for any offenses resulting from their collaboration. 9 It is unnecessary that the accessory be present or in any
way aid and abet the actual perpetration of the offense. 0 Furthermore, it is possible that the accessory will be held accountable for
an offense not contemplated by the parties. The case of Gant v.
State8' illustrates this point. The defendant hired Holiday to kill
the intended victim. Holiday attempted to carry out the charge,
but instead killed the daughter of the intended victim. The killing by Holiday was clearly first degree murder under a theory of
transferred intent"2 or felony-murder,8 and, as an accessory before the fact, defendant Gant was likewise charged with first degree murder.
B.

Aiding and Abetting

A party found guilty of aiding and abetting an offense is
chargeable with the crime committed by the principal.8 4 While
the parties must share a common intent to perpetrate the offense,
that intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence.89 In
8 the defendant, accompanied
Robinson v. Stateg
by Clark, parked
his automobile near a furniture store. Entering the store without
Clark, the defendant asked one of the two employees present to
show him a bedroom suite. Less than a minute later, Clark entered the store and asked the other employee to show him a sofabed. When the latter employee leaned over to demonstrate the
operation of the piece of furniture, Clark pressed a weapon
against his back and forced him into a back room. Escaping
through a rear door the employee quickly summoned the police.
Shortly thereafter, Clark was shot and killed by an officer outside

79. Id. § 39-108 (1955).
80. Mendolia v. State, 192 Tenn. 656, 241 S.W.2d 606 (1951).
81. 507 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
82. See Harper v. State, 206 Tenn. 509, 334 S.W.2d 933 (1960); Batts v. State, 189
Tenn. 30, 222 S.W.2d 190 (1946); see also 1 WHARTON § 193.

83.

See Sullivan v. State, 173 Tenn. 475, 121 S.W.2d 535 (1938).

84.

TENN. CODE ANN.

85.
86.

See 1970 Survey at 200.
513 S.W.2d 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).

§ 39-109 (1955).
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the store. The defendant, still on the premises, was then arrested.
In his possession were an empty holster and several bullets for a
revolver found on Clark's body. A money box from the furniture
store, bearing Clark's fingerprints, was found in the defendant's
automobile. The prosecution theorized that the defendant had
held the attention of one employee to enable Clark to carry out
the crime. 7 The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals found the
evidence sufficient to support a conviction for robbery.
IV. PROCEDURE

A. Arrest
1. Temporary Detention
The temporary detention of suspects under circumstances
short of probable cause for an arrest was approved by the United
States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio."' Such detentions must
themselves satisfy constitutional standards of reasonableness,
however. 0 In Manning v. Jarniganl the Court found that stopping an automobile on the order of the Chief of Police "to check
out all cars late at night," was not sufficiently justified under the
reasonableness test. Similarly, even where a vehicle was legitimately stopped for a license check, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held in United States v. Cupps2 that the driver could not
be required to exit the vehicle, absent probable cause to make an
arrest. The court further observed that "[plolice may not lawfully use their general inspection powers as a pretext for stopping
motorists for the purpose of inquiring about their business on the
9'
public highways.

3

In Effler v. State4 the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
87. Clark was a former employee of the furniture store and thus was familiar with
the premises.
88. Judge Galbreath dissented, conceding that it was highly probable that the defendant was an accomplice but that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of
guilt.
89. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Frequently, during such a confrontation the level of suspicion
will reach the level of probable cause and justify an arrest. See J. COOK, CONSTrrtTmONAL
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-NmiAL RIGHTS § 17, at 129-31 (1972) [hereinafter cited as

Pagrmu RIGHTS].
90. See PRETmAL RIGHTS § 7, at 50-57.

91.
92.
93.
94.

501 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1974).
503 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 282.
508 S.W.2d 809 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
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held that officers acted reasonably in detaining for investigation
an automobile positioned crosswise in the road at nighttime, particularly where the absence of lights was itself an offense 5 committed in the presence of the officers."
2.

Misdemeanors

While apparently not constitutionally compelled," at common law an arrest for a misdemeanor could only be made pursuant to a warrant or when the offense was committed in the
presence of the arresting officer."' In Williams v. State" the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that "an offense is not
committed in the presence of an officer when its commission is
communicated to him by another."' 00
B.
1.

Search and Seizure
Sufficiency of Warrant

The fourth amendment requires that a search warrant describe with particularity the place to be searched.' 0' The test for
determining the sufficiency of the description is a pragmatic one:
can the premises be located on the basis of the description in the
warrant? Given this test, it follows that errors in the warrant may
be tolerated if the description as a whole is unambiguous. 0 In the
case of a multi-unit building, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held in United States v. Olt' that the warrant must be limited
to specific premises for which probable cause has been shown,
unless the entire building has been used in common.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-909 (Supp. 1974).
96. Evidence linking the defendant to a burglary was observed on the back seat of
the automobile.
97. See ParrmAL RIGrrs § 14, at 93 n.5.
98. Id. § 14, at 92.
99. 506 S.W.2d 193 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
100. Id. at 197 (citations omitted); but see State v. Costa, 306 A.2d 36 (R.I. 1973).
101. See PRETRIAL RIGMS § 27; Cook, Requisite Particularityin Search Warrant
Authorizations, 38 TENN. L. Rav. 496 (1971).
102. United States v. Frazier, 491 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Shropshire, 378 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
103. United States v. Olt, 492 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1974); see also People v. Coulon,
273 Cal. App. 2d 148, 78 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1969).

95.
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Execution of Warrant

In Gooding v. United States,"'4 a narcotics case, the United
States Supreme Court sustained the nighttime execution of a
warrant for the search of a residence on the ground that the search
was authorized by federal statute. The majority confined its analysis to a determination of whether the federal statute or the more
restrictive District of Columbia Code provisions should apply.
The dissenting Justices'0 5 took issue with the failure of the majority to consider the fourth amendment aspect of the case,' which,
they contended, commanded a stronger showing of probable
cause to authorize a nighttime search of a residence."'0 Noting the
precedent established in Camara v. Municipal Court,108 permitting a relaxed standard of probable cause for administrative
inspections of urban residences, 09 the dissent argued that this
principle was not a "one-way street, to be used only to water down
104. 416 U.S. 430 (1974).
105. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan.
106. [T]here are other concerns implicated in our interpretation of this
congressional enactment restricting the issuance of search warrants-the protection of individual privacy which is the very purpose of the statute's search
warrant requirement and which of course is given constitutional recognition in
the Fourth Amendment. The Court seems totally oblivious to these constitutional considerations. Taking them into account, I find that the only acceptable
interpretation of the statute is one which requires some additional justification
for authorizing a nighttime search over and above the ordinary showing of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that evidence of the
crime will be found upon the search.
416 U.S. at 461-62.
107. [T]here is no expectation of privacy more reasonable and more demanding of constitutional protection than our right to expect that we will be
let alone in the privacy of our homes during the night. The idea of the police
unnecessarily forcing their way into the home in the middle of the
night-frequently, in narcotics cases, without knocking and announcing their
purpose-rousing the residents out of their beds, and forcing them to stand by
in indignity in their night clothes while the police rummage through their belongings does indeed smack of a "'police state' lacking in respect for ...
the
right of privacy dictated by the U.S. Constitution."
Id. at 462 (citation omitted).
108. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
109. The Court held that the quantum of probable cause required for issuance of
an inspection warrant had to be determined at least in part by the reasonableness of the
proposed search. The reasonableness was to be determined by balancing the need for
search against the invasion of privacy which the search would entail. In finding that the
search was reasonable the Court said, "[The inspections] involve a relatively limited
invasion of the urban citizen's privacy." Id. at 537; see also PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 66.
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the requirement of probable cause . . .,.
A search warrant is issued on the belief that the enumerated
items are presently to be found at the described premises. With
the passage of time, the likelihood of the continued presence of
the items becomes increasingly dubious; therefore the prompt
execution of a search warrant is itself a constitutional requirement."' There are no hard and fast guidelines for determining
prompt execution, however, since the possibilities may vary with
the nature of the crime and the evidence. In United States v.
Wilson"' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a six-day
delay in the execution of a warrant for narcotics was not unreasonable.
3.

Incident to Arrest

The constitutional standard for a warrantless search incident
to arrest was established by Chimel v. California,"' where the
United States Supreme Court limited such searches to the person
of the arrestee and the area in which he might reach for a weapon
or destructible evidence. The decision was unclear as to whether
the test was to be understood in spacial terms-that is, a certain
area surrounding the arrestee-or in purposive terms-that is,
the places the arrestee might actually reach."' The distinction
becomes critical in cases such as United States v. Isham." 5
Although the arrestee in that case had been handcuffed outside
his automobile prior to the search, the seizure of a rifle on the
back seat, covered by a coat and throw rug, was sustained by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals."'
110. "In some situations-and the search of a private home during nighttime would seem
to be a paradigm example-this principle requires a showing of additional justification
for a search over and above the ordinary showing of probable cause." 416 U.S. at 465
(citation omitted).
111. See PuamaiAL RIGHTS § 32, at 207 n.22.
112. 491 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1974).
113. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
114. The writer has discussed the ambiguity in the Chimel decision in Cook,
Searches Incident to Arrest, 24 Au. L. REv. 607, 621-23 (1972).
115. 501 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1974).
116. Actually, the seizure was sustained on the even more dubious Terry stop-andfrisk theory. The court noted that the defendant was rolling up a window and thus "must
have had his hands handcuffed in front of him." Id. at 991. Under these circumstances,
the court concluded that the officers' seizure was reasonable "for their own self-protection
within the Terry rationale." Id.
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A purposive interpretation of Chimel was substantially compromised in United States v. Robinson,"7 where the person of the
accused was searched incident to a custodial arrest for driving
without a license. In the process of the search, the officer recovered a crumpled cigarette package which appeared to contain
something other than cigarettes. Under a narrow, purposive reading of Chimel, the mere removal of the package would have been
sufficient to take it out of the area of the accused's reach and thus
to protect the safety of the officer and preclude the possible destruction of evidence, an examination of the contents of the package being unnecessary." 8 Nevertheless, the officer proceeded to
open the package and found within it gelatin capsules containing
heroin. The United States Supreme Court sustained the legality
of the search. A similar result was reached in Gustafson v.
Florida,"' with the added factor that there was no ostensible indication that the cigarette box contained anything other than its
customary contents. Again, the officer opened the box and discovered marijuana cigarettes. The Court held that the discovery of
20
the object entitled the officer to examine it more meticulously.
The Robinson and Gustafson cases also raised the question
of the propriety of a warrantless search incident to an arrest for
117. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
118. See id. at 256 (Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan,
dissenting):
To begin with, after [Officer] Jenks had the cigarette package in his hands,
there is no indication that he had reason to believe or did in fact believe that
the package contained a weapon. More importantly, even if the crumpled-up
cigarette package had in fact contained some sort of small weapon, it would have
been impossible for respondent to have used it once the package was in the
officer's hands . . . . It is suggested, however, that since the custodial arrest
itself represents a significant intrusion into the privacy of the person, any additional intrusion by way of opening or examining effects found on the person is
not worthy of constitutional protection. But such an approach was expressly
rejected by the Court in Chimel.
119. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
120. See also United States v. Crane, 499 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Kaye, 492 F.2d 744, 746 (6th Cir. 1974), where the court stated:
Our question is whether [the] search may extend to the suitcase Appellant
was carrying with him. We find that it can. . . . It is true, as Appellant contends, that Appellant had been subdued and presented no danger to the police
at the time the suitcase was opened. Nor was there the possibility that the
evidence in the suitcase would be destroyed as the suitcase was under the control
of the police. However, the authority to conduct a search incident to an arrest,
once established, still exists even after the need to disarm and prevent the
destruction of evidence have [sic] been dispelled.
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a traffic offense. In Robinson the officer had observed the respondent driving an automobile. Believing, by virtue of an investigation four days earlier, that his driver's license had been revoked, the officer stopped the vehicle and informed the respondent that he was under arrest. It was undisputed that the officer
"effected a full-custody arrest."'' 1 The Court held that the resulting search and seizure of the cigarette package containing heroin
capsules had been reasonable as incident to the lawful arrest of
the respondent. In thereby sanctioning a search incident to an
arrest for a traffic offense, the Court stressed the fact that the
respondent was to be taken into custody, even prior to the discovery of the heroin. 122 In Gustafson an officer stopped the vehicle

driven by the petitioner when he observed it weave across the
center line several times. The petitioner was unable to produce a
driver's license, whereupon the officer placed him under arrest.
It was conceded by both the prosecution and the defense that the
officer "took petitioner into custody in order to transport him to
the stationhouse for further inquiry."1 23 The reasonableness of the

resulting search and seizure was sustained by the Court, citing
4
12
Robinson as now being dispositive.
In United States v. Edwards125 the respondent was lawfully

arrested late one night and charged with attempting to break into
a post office. An investigation at the scene of the offense revealed
that an attempt had been made to pry open a window, in the
process of which paint chips had been left on the windowsill and
121. 414 U.S. at 221 (footnote omitted). This would appear to be the first instance
of the use of this term by the Court. In a footnote the term is defined by reference to
testimony at the evidentiary hearing as an arrest in which the party was to be transported
to the station for booking. Id. at 221-23 n.2.
122. Nor are we inclined, on the basis of what seems to us to be a rather
speculative judgment, to qualify the breadth of the general authority to search
incident to a lawful custodial arrest on an assumption that persons arrested for
the offense of driving while their license has been revoked are less likely to
possess dangerous weapons than are those arrested for other crimes. It is scarcely
open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far greater in the case of the
extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting
contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop. This is an adequate basis for
treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification.
Id. at 234-35 (footnote omitted).
123. 414 U.S. at 262.
124. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented in both
cases.
125. 415 U.S. 800 (1974), noted in 41 TENN. L. RaV. 932 (1974).
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screen. The respondent was immediately incarcerated, and the
following day clothing was purchased to substitute for the
clothing he had been wearing from the time of the arrest. The
exchange of clothing was made, and the items taken from the
accused were thereafter examined for evidence. Paint chips
matching those found at the scene of the crime were discovered
on the clothing and were introduced in evidence at trial over the
objection of the defense. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, "' finding that the arrest was lawful but
that the delayed seizure violated the fourth amendment. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, finding ample precedent to
support the principle that "searches and seizures that could be
made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted
later when the accused arrives at the place of detention.' '1 7 The
lower court had conceded as much but viewed the situation distinguishable "after the administrative process and the mechanics
of the arrest have come to a halt.' ' 2 The Supreme Court found
such a distinction unjustified.'
4.

Consent

The prosecution has the burden of proving consent to a warrantless search.3 0 The consent must be voluntary and unequivocal, '' but it is not always necessary that the suspect first be
apprised of his fourth amendment rights. 132 Whether a valid consent has been given is determined after examining the totality of
13
the circumstances. 3
126. United States v. Edwards, 474 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 415 U.S. 800
(1974).
127. 415 U.S. at 803. The court cited Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960),
and a number of federal courts of appeals decisions.
128. 474 F.2d at 1211.
129. This was and is a normal incident of a custodial arrest, and reasonable
delay in effectuating it does not change the fact that Edwards was no more
imposed upon than he could have been at the time and place of the arrest or
immediately upon arrival at the place of detention. The police did no more on
June 1 than they were entitled to do incident to the usual custodial arrest and
incarceration.
415 U.S. at 805.
130. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Bradley v. Cowan, 500 F.2d 380
(6th Cr. 1974); see generally PRarIuAL RIGHTS § 50.
131. See PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 50.
132. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Earls v. Tennessee, 379 F.
Supp. 576 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); see 1973 Survey at 229-30.
133. See Manning v. Jarnigan, 501 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1974); Earls v. Tennessee, 379
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The effectiveness of third-party consent came before the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Matlock.'4 The
respondent was arrested for robbery while standing in the yard of
the house in which he lived with, among others, a woman to
whom he was not married. The officers did not request that the
respondent consent to a search of the premises, nor did they
inquire as to which part of the premises he occupied. Instead,
they went to the entrance of the house and were admitted by the
woman, who then consented to a search of the house, including a
portion purportedly occupied by the respondent and herself. In
the jointly occupied bedroom the officers discovered a substantial
amount of cash which later was introduced at the trial of the
respondent." 5 The Court concluded that the consent by the
woman was effective against the respondent and therefore that
the evidence discovered in the jointly occupied premises could
properly be introduced at the respondent's trial.'
5.

Vehicles

Warrantless searches of vehicles are frequently sustained
under a variety of circumstances. Most commonly, if officers have
probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains seizable evidence, a warrantless seizure will normally be sustained since the
inherent mobility of the vehicle makes obtaining a warrant impractical.' 37 Occasionally, a court will consider whether the officers had reason to believe a particular vehicle would disappear if
a warrant were sought.'38
Even absent probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains seizable evidence, such vehicle may be subject to search
because the police gain lawful custody of it by virtue of specific
enabling statutes or by other justifiable circumstances. 39 Thus,
F. Supp. 576 (E.D. Tenn. 1974) (presence of five or six law enforcement officers did not
vitiate consent).
134. 415 U.S. 164 (1974), noted in 41 TENN. L. REv. 923 (1974).
135. Other seizures made in various portions of the house were not in issue here. Id.
at 167 n.1.
136. Id. at 177.
137. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); United States v. Kemper, 503 F.2d
327 (6th Cir. 1974); see generally PPtrui. RIGHTS § 61.
138. United States v. Young, 489 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1974).
139. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), where a state statute, after defendant's arrest for a narcotics violation, authorized the police to seize the automobile
used unlawfully to transport the narcotics; see also Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234

TENNESSEE LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 42

in Capp v. State,'° during a temporary detention of a vehicle, the
legality of which was not questioned, officers observed a firearm
on the floorboard and arrested the occupants for a violation of the
National Firearms Act.' 4 ' Under the Contraband Seizure Act,'
the vehicle thereupon became subject to seizure.' A subsequent
inventory of the contents of the vehicle revealed other incriminating evidence, the seizure of which was sustained by the Tennessee
Supreme Court."'
Recent decisions have extended the custody search rationale
even to situations where there is no actual police custody of the
vehicle. In Cady v. Dombrowski,'45 a 1973 decision, the United
States Supreme Court held that the search of a vehicle taken to
a private wrecker lot at the direction of the police was proper
because the officers reasoned that the arrested driver, an offduty policeman, might have had a service revolver with him.'"
Searches for a loaded weapon'47 and explosives'" recently have
been sustained under the Cady rationale." 9
In Cardwell v. Lewis' ° the United States Supreme Court
considered the propriety of the warrantless seizure of an automobile and the subsequent examination of the tire tread and the
taking of paint scrapings from the exterior of the vehicle. In this
case the respondent had been requested to appear at the police
station in regard to a homicide investigation. By the time of his
arrival, an arrest warrant had been obtained, and although no
search warrant had been sought for the vehicle, the police had
(1968), where the police, after arresting the defendant on robbery charges, lawfully gained
custody of the defendant's automobile by impounding the vehicle for use as evidence to
show that this vehicle was the one seen leaving the robbery site.
140. 505 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1974).
141. 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1970).
142. 49 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
143. "That act requires that automobiles used to transport contraband, such as the
illegal shotgun, be seized and forfeited." 505 S.W.2d at 728.
144. The court submitted alternatively that the discovery of the firearm gave rise
to probable cause for a further search of the vehicle. See also United States v. White, 488
F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1973).
145. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
146. See 1973 Survey at 230-31.
147. United States v. Isham, 501 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1974).
148. United States v. Lewis, 504 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1974).
149. In both cases, however, unlike in Cady, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
found probable cause to support the search.
150. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).

19751

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

probable cause to believe that his automobile had been used in
the perpetration Qf the crime.' 5 ' The respondent parked his automobile in a commercial lot a short distance from the station.
Upon his arrest, he surrendered his car keys and the parking lot
claim check. Thereafter, the vehicle was removed by officers to
the police impoundment lot. The following day paint samples
taken from defendant's car were found to match traces left on the
automobile used by the victim. In addition, positive identification of the tire tread further indicated that the respondent's automobile had been used in the perpetration of the crime.
The Court inconclusively split four to four on the reasonableness of the search and seizure of the automobile, but the
search and seizure was sustained by virtue of a concurring
opinion on a nonsubstantive theory.' 2 Building upon the unique
considerations traditionally afforded vehicle searches, the plurality opinion found support for sustaining the search and seizure in
this case in the Katz'5 3 reasonable expectation of privacy analysis:,54
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's
residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little
capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view.'55
Moreover, in the present case the search did not intrude within
the vehicle. Given the conceded probable cause to carry out the
search, the Justices "fail[ed] to comprehend what expectation
of privacy was infringed."' 5 6
The plurality opinion in Cardwell then turned to the ques151. It appeared that an automobile, thought to be that of the respondent, had
pushed an automobile occupied by the victim over an embankment, causing his death.
Casts of tire tracks and paint scrapings, both left by the assaulting vehicle, were taken at
the scene of the offense.
152. Justice Powell, concurring, reiterated his position in a concurring opinion in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973), that federal collateral review of
fourth amendment claims in a state trial should be limited to whether the petitioner "was
denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in the state courts." 417 U.S. at
596.
153. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
154. Id. at 351.
155. 417 U.S. at 590.
156. Id. at 591 (footnote omitted).
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tion of the impoundment of the automobile without a warrant, a
procedure which was not necessary to obtain the identification
evidence. Instead, the police could have obtained a warrant for
the seizure of the vehicle and postponed the examination for evidence until their possession was given judicial authorization; or,
the police could have obtained the identification evidence at the
commercial parking lot without moving the vehicle. Either alternative would have been less constitutionally intrusive than the
course followed. The inherent mobility argument, which is frequently used to sustain warrantless searches of vehicles," 7 is far
less persuasive when, as in Cardwell, the party controlling the
vehicle is incarcerated. Nevertheless, the Justices concluded that
the manner of the search was constitutionally reasonable, quoting
a passage from Chambers v. Maroney5 8 addressed to a comparable issue:
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the
one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying
out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable
cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 5 9
The difficulty of this argument is that it says too much. By this
reasoning, any warrantless search could be sustained if in retrospect it was shown or conceded that probable cause existed. It is
true that a warrantless search is no greater an intrusion on privacy than a warrant search. But the purpose of favoring warrants
is to obtain a judicial ruling as to whether the search should be
carried out at all and to have that determination made prior to
the search. Ironically, in the Katz case the Court had conceded
probable cause for an electronic eavesdrop but held the seizure
unreasonable because no prior judicial authorization was obtained.
The four dissenting Justices contended that, in the absence
of any argument that the vehicle would or could be moved, the
justification for the vehicle exception was simply not present.
Therefore, they maintained, the presumption favoring the use of
warrants whenever possible should have been honored. 60
157.
158.
159.
160.

See note 137 supra.
399 U.S. 42 (1970).
Id. at 52.
"The most fundamental rule in this area of constitutional law is that "searches
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6.

Fruits of Illegal Search

Once a search is determined to have been illegal, both the
evidence seized and any derivative evidence is inadmissible.'"' A
search warrant issued on the basis of information obtained by a
previous illegal search is itself illegal. 61 2 The prosecution occasionally seeks to avoid this so-called "fruits" doctrine by employing
the "inevitable discovery" notion-if it appears certain that the
government would ultimately have gained the evidence in a legal
manner, the illegality should not preclude admissibility., 3 In
United States v. Griffin"4 officers made an illegal search of an
apartment at five o'clock in the afternoon and returned four hours
later with a search warrant which was obtained without the use
of any information gained through the prior illegal search. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to accept the contention
that the evidence seized in the first search inevitably would have
been legally discovered because to do so would "emasculate the
search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment."'' 5
7.

Hearing on Admissibility

In United States v. Matlock' the United States Supreme
Court held "that the rules of evidence normally applicable in
criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the
judge to determine the admissibility of evidence."'' 1 In accordance with the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court
concluded that preliminary questions of admissibility "are matters for the judge and that in performing this function he is not
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions." 417 U.S. at 596 (citations omitted).
161. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); see PRETRIAL
RIGHTS § 71.
162. United States v. Stoner, 487 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1973).
163. See Comment, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 88 (1974).
164. 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974).
165. Id. at 961.
166. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
167. Id. at 172-73 (footnote omitted). The Court quoted Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949), which concerned not an exclusionary hearing but a proceeding
for the determination of probable cause, as compared to a trial: "There is a large difference
between the two things to be proved, as well as between the tribunals which determine
them, and therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them." 415 U.S. at 173.
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bound by the Rules of Evidence except those with respect to
privileges."'' 8 Analogizing this function to that of issuing arrest
and search warrants, the Court concluded that the judge should
simply "receive the evidence and give it such weight as'his
judgment and experience counsel."' 89
C.

Guilty Plea

To be effective, a guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligently entered by the accused. Two cases decided during 1974
raised the issue of improper coercion exerted upon the accused by
his own attorney. Ray v. Rose 7 " was a habeas corpus proceeding
attacking the validity of a guilty plea entered by James Earl Ray.
Counsel had originally agreed to represent Ray in his prosecution
for the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. only if Ray made
him his exclusive agent regarding any publishing contracts' 7 and
assigned him forty percent of all income received by Ray as a
result of a publishing contract with William Bradford Huie. 72
Two days prior to the date set for trial, Ray discharged his attorney and retained another. Eventually, the contract rights were
assigned to the new attorney, with the modification that counsel
would receive sixty percent of the income from Huie's publications. 7 A little over a month later, Ray pled guilty to first degree
murder and was sentenced to a term of ninety-nine years. Thereafter, Ray contended that the financial interests of his attorneys
had resulted in conflicts of interest which had prejudiced his
168. 415 U.S. at 173-74. The Court referred to Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
104(a) and 1101(d)(1) in reaching this conclusion. These particular rules were not
amended when the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted into law on January 2, 1975.
88 Stat. 1926 (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1-37 (Jan. 15, 1975)).
169. 415 U.S. at 175 (footnote omitted).
170. 491 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1974).
171. Hanes was to act as "exclusive agent and attorney" for Ray "in the
handling of his affairs, contracts, negotiations, and sale of any and all rights to
information or privacy which he may have in and to his life or particular events
therein to persons, groups or corporations for the purpose of writing, publishing,
filming or telecasting in any form whatever."
Id. at 286.
172. Under the agreement negotiated with Huie, the attorney and Ray were each to
receive 30 percent of the gross receipts from the sale of Huie's work. Under the agreement
between the attorney and Ray, apparently the attorney got 40 percent of Ray's 30 percent.
Thus, in the final analysis the attorney got 42 percent and Ray 18 percent of the gross
receipts.
173. The author would receive 40 percent; Ray would receive nothing.
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defense. He alleged that he was coerced to plead guilty because
the contract rights would be virtually worthless if he was tried
and acquitted.' The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, for if the allegations were true, "[s]uch conduct would constitute an outrageous
abrogation of the standards which the legal profession sets for
itself and upon which its clients have a right to rely."'7 5
In Peete v. Rose' 5 counsel induced the defendant to plead
guilty by advising him that if he went to trial he would have a
"Ku Klux" jury that would send him to the electric chair. The
United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee concluded that, assuming a plea of guilty was considered by
counsel to be in the best interests of his client, his advice nevertheless amounted to a threat which rendered the defendant's plea
involuntary.
174.

Among the allegations contained in the habeas corpus petition were the follow-

ing:
(2) Ray felt that at trial it would be necessary for him to take the stand in his
own defense so that he could explain his actions on the day of the murder. Hanes
[first counsel] rejected the idea saying, "Why give testimony away when we
can sell it?"
(3) Ray urged Hanes to seek a continuance because of substantial, adverse
pretrial publicity. Hanes refused because the contract with Huie provided that
they must go to trial within a certain number of days.
(5) Despite the urgings of Ray, Foreman [second counsel] refused to take any
action to halt adverse, pretrial publicity.
(6) On February 13, 1969, Foreman brought a document tQ the jail which he
urged Ray to sign. Included therein was an authorization for Foreman to negotiate a guilty plea and also a waiver of any claim against either Huie or Look
magazine for damaging Ray's chances for a fair trial . ...
491 F.2d at 287-88 (footnotes omitted).
175. Id. at 289.
It would be difficult to conjure up a more flagrant violation of an attorney's duty
to his client or one more likely to prejudice him in the defense of his case. While
a lawyer in some circumstances may appropriately advise his client to plead
guilty if he has knowledge of the pertinent facts and his advice is honestly and
conscientiously given, the opposite is true where the attorney induces a plea of
guilty solely for his own gain and without performing the minimum service of
investigating the true facts of the case. The latter is true in the present case if
we accept, as we must, the allegations of the petitioner.
Id.
176. 381 F. Supp. 1167 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
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Right of Confrontation
1. Cross-examination

The sixth amendment right of an accused to cross-examine
adverse witnesses may on occasion conflict with the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination of the witness. While
the fifth amendment privilege will not be compromised, efforts
will be made to minimize the resulting prejudice to the accused.
For example, in Douglas v. Alabama'" a co-conspirator was called
as a witness by the prosecution and asked if he had made a
confession of the crime charged. The witness asserted the fifth
amendment privilege, whereupon the prosecutor proceeded to
read the confession, a few sentences at a time, inquiring whether
the witness had not so confessed. The confession implicated the
defendant in the crime. The witness continued to assert the privilege both on direct and cross-examination. While not questioning
the privilege of the witness, the United States Supreme Court
held that the defendant had been denied the sixth amendment
right of confrontation.
Similarly, in United States v. Stephens7 ' a hearsay statement was properly admitted in evidence as a statement made by
a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. The defendant
sought to call the maker of the statement as a witness but was
denied the opportunity on the ground that the potential witness
could properly assert the privilege against self-incrimination. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals conceded that the privilege was
applicable to the witness but held that he nevertheless should
have been required to take the stand and assert the privilege, thus
entitling the defendant to at least this degree of confrontation.'79
A second issue raised in the Stephens case was the appropriate judicial response when the witness has answered questions on
direct examination but refuses to answer certain questions on
cross-examination. The court delineated three categories of testimony in respect to which the issue might arise:8 0
177. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
178. 492 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1974).
179. This may also be viewed as a deprivation of the sixth amendment right of
compulsory process. See J. COOK, CONSTrrTUIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-TRIAL RIGHTS
§ 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as TRIAL RIGHTS).
180. The classification was derived from United States v, Caradillo, 316 F.2d 606
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963).
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If the answer sought would have been so closely related to the
crime for which the defendants were being tried, that the
defendants may be substantially prejudiced by being deprived
of their right to test the truth of the witness' direct testimony,
the entire testimony of the witness should be stricken. If the
subject matter of the testimony is connected with only a part,
but not all, of the case being tried, a partial striking of the
witness' testimony might suffice. The third category consists of
testimony involved in collateral matters or cumulative testimony concerning credibility. The refusal of a witness to submit
to cross-examination on such matters as these does not require
that any testimony be stricken, but can be handled by a charge
to the jury. 8 '
From a constitutional perspective, the court saw the issue as
"whether there has been an adequate confrontation between the
accused and the accusor to satisfy the confrontation clause of the
Sixth Amendment."' 82 Since in Stephens the question posited
during cross-examination fell within the third category described
above, the court concluded that it was within the discretion of the
trial court to determine what, if any, testimony should be
stricken.
In Davis v. Alaska' 3 the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutional propriety of denying the defense the
right to pursue a particular line of questioning on crossexamination.'84 The witness Green had identified the accused in
a photographic display as the individual he had observed at a
location where an abandoned stolen safe was later found. Green
was on probation as a result of being adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. Prior to the taking of any testimony at the trial of the
accused, the prosecution moved for a protective order to bar any
reference by the defense to the juvenile record of Green. Counsel
for the accused opposed the motion, indicating that while he was
not interested in impeaching the witness generally by reference
to his record, he hoped to show that because Green was on probation, his testimony might be subject to undue pressure resulting
181. 492 F.2d at 1375.
182. Id. (citations omitted).
183. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
184. Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, was concerned with the
precedential effect of entertaining such questions: "[Tlhe Court insists on . . .in effect
inviting federal review of every ruling of a state trial judge who believes cross-examination
has gone far enough." Id. at 321.
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from the fear of possible probation revocation. The trial court
nevertheless granted the protective order.
Precluded from inquiring into Green's probation, defense
counsel endeavored to show the state of mind of the witness as
effectively as possible ' by suggesting that the witness feared the
185.

Defense counsel cross-examined Green, in part, as follows:
"Q. Were you upset at all by the fact that this safe was found on your
property?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Did you feel that they might in some way suspect you of this?
"A. No.
"Q. Did you feel uncomfortable about this though?
"A. No, not really.
"Q. The fact that a safe was found on your property?
"A. No.
"Q. Did you suspect for a moment that the police might somehow think
that you were involved in this?
"A. I thought they might ask a few questions is all.
"Q. Did the thought ever enter your mind that you-that the police might
think that you were somehow connected with this?

"A. No, it didn't really bother me, no.
"Q. Well, but ....
"A. I mean, you know, it didn't-it didn't come into my mind as worrying
me, you know.
"Q. That really wasn't-wasn't my question, Mr. Green. Did you think
that-not whether it worried you so much or not, but did you feel that there
was a possibility that the police might somehow think that you had something
to do with this, that they might have that in mind, not that you ....
"A. That came across my mind, yes, sir.
"Q. That did cross your mind?
"A. Yes.
"Q. So as I understand it you went down to the-you drove in with the
police in-in their car from mile 25, Glenn Highway down to the city police
station?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And then went into the investigators' room with Investigator Gray
and Investigator Weaver?
"A. Yeah.
"Q. And they started asking you questions about-about the incident, is
that correct?
"A. Yeah.
"Q. Had you ever been questioned like that before by any law enforcement
officers?
"A. No.
"MR. RIPLEY: I'm going to object to this, Your Honor, it's a carry-on with
rehash of the same thing. He's attempting to raise in the jury's mind . . ..
"THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection."
Id. at 312-13.
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police might have suspected him of being implicated in the burglary. In response to a question by defense counsel, Green denied
ever having been interrogated by the police prior to this instance,
a response which the Supreme Court characterized as "a questionably truthful answer" which probably would not "have been
given by Green absent a belief that he was shielded from traditional cross-examination."'5' 8
The Supreme Court concluded that the restriction on crossexamination denied the accused the right of confrontation.'
It
did not feel that the limited cross-examination afforded the defense a sufficient opportunity to attack the credibility of the witness.188 While acknowledging that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting the juvenile offender from exposure of his record,
the Court reasoned that that concern could not outweigh the
accused's right of confrontation. 89
2.

Confession of Co-defendant

Under the holding of Bruton v. United States,110 it is consti186. Id. at 314.
187. Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability
of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the
broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing
interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness'
story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has
traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness. One way of
discrediting the witness is to introduce evidence of a prior criminal conviction
of that witness. By so doing the cross-examiner intends to afford the jury a basis
to infer that the witness' character is such that he Would be less likely than the
average trustworthy citizen to be truthful in his testimony. The introduction
of evidence of a prior crime is thus a general attack on the credibility of the
witness. A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is effected by means
of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or
ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.
Id. at 316.
188. On the basis of the limited cross-examination that was permitted, the
jury might well have thought that defense counsel was engaged in a speculative
and baseless line of attack on the credibility of an apparently blameless witness
or, as the prosecutor's objection put it, a rehash of prior cross-examination.
Id. at 318.
189. Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to Green or his
family by disclosure of his juvenile record-if the prosecution insisted on using
him to make its case-is outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into the
influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness.
Id. at 319.
190. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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tutionally impermissible to introduce the confession of a
defendant if the confession implicates a co-defendant and the
confessing defendant does not elect to testify.'' In United States
v. Crane'2 the court appraised the use of a bifurcated trial in
order to avoid the Bruton problem while retaining the judicial
economy of a joint trial. The two defendants were tried together,
but the jury first heard the evidence on the first count which only
affected the co-defendant and did not include defendant's confession. After considering this evidence the jury returned a verdict
of not guilty. Next, the jury heard evidence on the second count,
involving only the defendant, and subsequently returned a verdict of guilty against him. Under these circumstances, the court
concluded that the guilty defendant was not prejudiced by the
joint trial, since the co-defendant was acquitted.'9 3 Furthermore,
the court pointed out that the record convincingly supported a
verdict of guilty as to the defendant." 4 The court, however, conceded that the result of this case was wholly fortuitous and concluded that because there would be no way to calculate the possibility of prejudice at the beginning of a joint trial, " "the safest
course would appear to be the traditional use of the severance
device."9 6
E.

Right to Counsel

1. Preliminary Hearing
The right to counsel at a preliminary hearing was recognized
by the Tennessee Supreme Court in McKeldin v. State."7 Following his arrest, defendant was represented by appointed counsel
who, it was later discovered, was neither trained nor licensed to
191. Cf. Briggs v. State, 501 S.W.2d 831 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
192. 499 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir. 1974).
193. Of course, the not-guilty verdict might simply indicate that the co-defendant's
confession convinced the jury that the defendant was solely responsible for the crime.
194. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
195. If a jury were to find one of the defendants guilty, there could be a
serious question whether the same jury could later give his codefendant the
dispassionate and unprejudiced hearing required by due process and by the
sixth amendment. In such a case the risk of prejudice would be unacceptably
high. And of course the trial judge cannot predict at the beginning of the trial
what the jury's verdict will be as to the defendant whose case is first presented.
499 F.2d at 1388.
196. Id.
197. 516 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1974). The case was not reported until early 1975 but has
been included in this survey because of its significance.
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practice law. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on
the ground that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel
at his preliminary hearing, which he contended was a critical
stage of the proceeding.
The result sought by the defendant was not unequivocally
compelled by the Constitution.'9 8 The United States Supreme
Court first recognized a right to counsel at a preliminary hearing
in White v. Maryland,'" but only because the defendant had been
called upon to plead. In Coleman v. Alabama °° the Court discussed the substantial benefits which accrue from representation
by counsel at a preliminary hearing but required that actual prejudice be shown before a new trial would be granted.
In McKeldin the Tennessee Supreme Court found no material distinction between the Alabama statute involved in the
Coleman case and the Tennessee preliminary hearing statute 0 '
and concluded that the preliminary hearing is a "pretrial type of
2 °2
arraignment where certain rights may be sacrificed or lost.
Every criminal lawyer "worth his salt" knows the overriding importance and the manifest advantages of a preliminary
hearing. In fact the failure to exploit this golden opportunity to
observe the manner, demeanor and appearance of the witnesses
for the prosecution, to learn the precise details of the prosecution's case, and to engage in that happy event sometimes known
as a "fishing expedition," would be an inexcusable dereliction
of duty, in the majority of cases.
To hold that an indigent defendant is not entitled to counsel during this critical event, is to ignore basic standards of
competency and to disregard the accumulated learning and experience of the defense bar."
The court therefore concluded that the right to counsel applied
to the preliminary hearing and that the state must provide com198. See

TRIAL RIGHTS §

26.

199. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
200. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
201. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1101 to -1131 (Supp. 1974). "In each state a preliminary
hearing is simply a forum for determining (1) whether an offense has been committed, (2)
whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is guilty of its commission and (3) whether and how much bail should be set." 516 S.W.2d at 85 (footnote
omitted).
202. 516 S.W.2d at 85.
203. Id. at 85-86.
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petent counsel to an indigent defendant at this stage of the proceeding. The case was remanded for a determination of whether
the absence of effective counsel at the preliminary hearing was
20 4
harmless error.
2.

On Appeal

In Ross v. Moffitt °5 the United States Supreme Court held
2
11 to
that the right to counsel guaranteed in Douglas v. California
extend
to
discretionary
appeal
did
not
indigents on their first
appeals in state courts or applications for review to the United
States Supreme Court. The Court acknowledged that the rationale for the Douglas and the earlier Griffin 207 decisions had "never
been explicitly stated, some support being derived from the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
28
some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment.
Insofar as the due process rationale was concerned, the Court
recognized a crucial distinction between the trial and appellate
stages of a criminal proceeding. In the case of a trial the judicial
machinery has been triggered by the state in an effort "to convert
a criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to one
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 9 In such a context, it
is fundamentally important that the accused be provided professional assistance to assure a fair trial. By contrast, it is ordinarily
204. In making this determination the Court will follow the following procedural standards:
1. A full evidentiary hearing will be conducted.
2. If petitioner continues to be indigent counsel will be provided.
3. The burden of going forward with the evidence will be upon the
petitioner.
4. A transcript of the hearing will be made.
5. The trial judge will rule upon the issue of prejudice and (a) award a
new trial of (b) order the reinstatement of the conviction.
6. Either party may, as a matter of right, have the ruling of the trial
judge considered by the Court of Criminal Appeals by simply filing with
the Clerk of that Court, an authenticated transcript of the proceedings
on remand.
7. Counsel may submit briefs, but oral argument will not be permitted.
Id. at 87.
205. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
206. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
207. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
208. 417 U.S. at 608-09 (footnote omitted).
209. Id. at 610.
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the defendant who initiates the appellate process in an effort to
overturn a finding of guilt at the trial level. Recognizing, as the
Court had in Douglas, that the state need not provide any appeal
at all, the Court concluded that "[t]he fact that an appeal has
been provided does not automatically mean that a State then acts
unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to indigent defendants at
every stage of the way." 10 Whatever unfairness may result is in
no event a denial of due process; at most there is a denial of equal
protection reflected in a disparate access to the appellate process
because of poverty.
Turning then to the equal protection argument, the substance of the Court's response was to concede the necessity of line
drawing:
Despite the tendency of all rights "to declare themselves
absolute to their logical extreme," there are obviously limits
beyond which the equal protection analysis may not be pressed
without doing violence to principles recognized in other decisions of this Court. The Fourteenth Amendment "does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages" . . . .
The question is not one of absolutes, but one of degrees."'
By guaranteeing the effective assistance of counsel at the first
appellate level under the Douglas holding, the Court concluded
that the requisites of equal protection had been satisfied and that
continued assistance of counsel at higher levels of appeal would
be of limited additional value. Supporting this conclusion, the
Court expressed a view of the purpose of discretionary review
which emphasized the public significance of the issues to be adjudicated, rather than a determination of the correctness of the
adjudication of guilt. Insofar as discretionary review to the
United States Supreme Court was concerned, the Court noted
further that it was inappropriate to accord the state responsibility
for affording equal opportunity to all persons regardless of wealth
since Congress rather than the state was responsible for the availability of such discretionary review.
3.

Effective Assistance

The traditional standard for determining whether the assis210.
211.

Id. at 611 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 611-12 (footnote and citations omitted).
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tance of counsel was effective has been whether the trial is reduced to a farce or mockery of justice.1 2 An increasing number
of courts, however, have found this phrase inadequate to delineate a constitutional standard.21 1 In Beasley v. United States214 the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the growing list of courts
critical of the standard by castigating the "farce and mockery"
definition as "mere metaphorical- gloss" and a "conclusory description.

215

In its place, the court held "that the assistance of

counsel required under the Sixth Amendment is counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance." 1 6 Under this standard a violation results if defense counsel "deprive[s] a criminal defendant of a substantial defense by
his own ineffectiveness or incompetence."2 '7 And, "[ilt is a denial of the right to the effective assistance of counsel for an attorney to advise his client erroneously on a clear point of laW if this
advice leads to the deprivation of his client's right to a fair
trial."2'

State decisions continue to hold that the issue of effective
assistance cannot be raised when counsel is retained by the
defendant." 9 However, Judge Russell of the Tennessee Court of
212. See TmAL RIGHTS § 45, at 133 n.43.
213. See, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1971); United
States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970); Scott v. United States, 427
F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1970); State v. Hager, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973); see also
TRIAL RIGHTS § 45, at 135 n.43.1.
214. 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
215. Phrases often take on a life of their own. Divorced from the context
in which they were born, they spawn new results based on interpretations of
themselves, rather than on a close scrutiny of the actual holding for which they
were a description. Each case must stand on its own merits, and our application
of constitutional rules must always relate back to the language and policies of
the Constitution. The phrase "farce and mockery" has no obvious intrinsic
meaning. What may appear a "farce" to one court may seem a humdrum proceeding to another. The meaning of the Sixth Amendment does not, of course,
vary with the sensibilities and subjective judgments of various courts. The law
demands objective explanation, so as to ensure the even dispensation of justice.
Id. at 692 (footnote omitted).
216. Id. at 696. "Defense counsel must perform at least as well as a lawyer with
ordinary training and skill in the criminal law and must conscientiously protect his client's
interest, undeflected by conflicting considerations." Id. (citations omitted).
217. Id. (citations omitted).
218. Id. (citations omitted).
219. Waggoner v. State, 512 S.W.2d 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974); Long v. State,
510 S.W.2d 83 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974). See also 1972 Survey at 604; 1971 Survey at 273;
1970 Survey at 225; 1969 Survey at 482; 1968 Survey at 251; see generally TRIAL RIGHTS §
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Criminal Appeals, concurring in Waggoner v. State,"' submitted
that there was no justification for drawing such a distinction and
" ' in which
cited a United States Supreme Court decision22
the fact
that counsel was retained apparently was not considered material
by the Court in its determination of whether effective assistance
was rendered. Notable also is the fact that a recent decision by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the failure of
retained counsel to perfect an appeal may deprive the defendant
2 22
of constitutional rights.
F.
1.

Confessions

Miranda Requirements

The standards prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona 2 3 are
applicabli only when a suspect has been subjected to custodial
interrogation. 2 41 Warnings therefore are normally not required for
on-the-scene investigations .225 Also, spontaneous utterances are
not barred by Miranda.2 1 While the warnings must include the
fact that an attorney will be provided if the accused is unable to
afford one, in Kilburn v. State227 the absence of this warning did
not preclude admissibility of the defendant's statement to police,
since the accused was not in fact indigent. 28 The Kilburn case
also raised the question of whether a juvenile should be afforded
the opportunity to consult his parents as well as counsel prior to
questioning. While a few courts have deemed parental consultations to be as important and thus as constitutionally compelling
as consultations with counsel, 2 9 in Kilburn the possibility was
dismissed because the parents of the suspect were at home at the
time he was taken into custody and were advised of the reason
for and the place of custodial questioning.
220. 512 S.W.2d 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
221. Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250 (1972); see also Skinner v. State, 472 S.W.2d
903 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
222. Boyd v. Cowan, 494 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1974).
223. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

224.

See TRIAL RIGHTS §§ 83-84.

225. Cole v. State, 512 S.W.2d 598 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974); Abbott v. State, 509
S.W.2d 524 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
226. Kilburn v. State, 509 S.W.2d 237 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
227. Id.
228. See TuAL RIGHTS § 81.
229. Id. § 80, at 314-15 n.57.
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In United States v. Vaughn 3 1 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the refusal of the suspect to sign a waiver form
23
does not in itself preclude an effective waiver of rights. '
2.

Tacit Admissions

In a critical footnote the Miranda opinion prohibited the
prosecution from using "at trial the fact that [the accused] stood
mute or claims his privilege in the face of accusation. 23 1 In
Glinsey v. Parker23 3 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held it
improper to infer acquiescence on the part of an individual who
remains silent in the presence of another who makes a statement
implicating him in criminal behavior. In Collins v. State234 the
defendant objected to an officer testifying that the defendant
declined to talk to him. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
held the statement properly admitted, with the admonition to the
jury that it was to be considered only on the issue of mental
23 5
competence, the defense having raised the issue of sanity.
3.

Fruits of Miranda Violations

A further retreat from the Miranda standard was evidenced
by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v.
Tucker.23 The issue raised in that case was whether the testimony
of a witness should have been excluded at trial because the
identity of the witness was secured through interrogation of the
respondent in violation of Miranda. Although the interrogation of
the respondent had occurred prior to the decision in Miranda, his
case was tried after that decision, and thus under the holding of
Johnson v. New Jersey,2 37 the Miranda standard was applicable.
230. 496 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1974).
231. See also United States v. Caulton, 498 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1974); Bowling v.
State, 458 S.W.2d 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970); TRIALIPGHTS § 87, at 341 n.49.
232. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966); see TRIALRIGHTS § 86.
233. 491 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1974).
234. 506 S.W.2d 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
235. [lIt is highly improbable that the jury inferred any consciousness of
his guilt from the defendant's statement to the criminal investigator, in view of
his insistence that he remembered nothing from the time he left the drive-in
restaurant in Milan the night before until he awakened in jail after the killing,
and in view also of the court's instruction to the jury concerning that statement.
Id. at 186-87; see also 1972 Survey at 606-07.
236. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
237. 384-U.S. 719 (1966).
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The Court in Tucker chose to make a distinction between the
privilege against self-incrimination and "the prophylactic
standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard
that privilege.

2 38

In that light, the Court reasoned that nothing

in the series of events that occurred in Tucker could properly be
construed as violative of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Granting a violation of the Miranda standards, "[t]he question
for decision [was] how sweeping the
judicially imposed conse'239

quences of this disregard shall be.

Given the fact that the police had complied with the prevailing constitutional standard at the time of the interrogation, 24 0 and

that the only omission from. the Miranda requirements was the
failure to apprise the accused of the right to appointed counsel if
he could not afford one, the Court saw little deterrent value in
denying the use of the witness' testimony. Nor did the omission
in the warnings in any way affect the trustworthiness of the testimony of the witness. 24' Acknowledging that the pervasive impact

of Mirandahad already been once compromised in Harris v. New
York242 by permitting statements obtained in violation of
Miranda to be used for purposes of impeachment, the Court concluded that there was sufficient reason to create an additional
exception in this case.
In a concurring opinion Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, sought to limit the holding to a finding that in cases
involving interrogation prior to Miranda but resulting in trial
after that decision, the Miranda standard was applicable only to
"direct statements" made with insufficient prior warnings and
was not applicable to the "fruits" obtained from those prior statements.2

3

On the other hand, Justice White, concurring, preferred

238. 417 U.S. at 446.
239. Id. at 445.
240. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
241. There is plainly no reason to believe that Henderson's testimony is
untrustworthy simply because respondent was not advised of his right to ap-

pointed counsel. Henderson was both available at trial and subject to crossexamination by respondent's counsel, and counsel fully used this opportunity,
suggesting in the course of his cross-examination that Henderson's character
was less than exemplary and -that he had been offered incentives by the police
to testify against respondent.
417 U.S. at 449 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
242. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
243. I would confine the reach of Johnson v. New Jersey to those cases in
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to hold more broadly that Miranda would not bar the testimony
of persons whose identity was secured from statements inadmissible under Miranda."' Justice Douglas was the lone dissenter." 5
G.

Trial by Jury

Right in Contempt Proceedings

1.

In Bloom v. Illinois4' the United States Supreme Court held
that the sixth amendment right to trial by jury was applicable in
a contempt proceeding when the accused received a sentence of
at least six months.2 4 ' In Taylor v. Hayes"' the issue was whether
the right should apply if a sentence in excess of six months was
imposed but thereafter reduced to less than six months. The
Court saw no reason to make a distinction in terms of whether the
punishment was limited before or after conviction and thus held
that a jury trial was not constitutionally compelled in Taylor.
2.

Intrusions in the Jury Room

The extent to which jurors may consider facts known to them
but inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial arose in
Fairbanks v. State. 4 ' In that case the defendant, charged with
armed robbery, relied on an alibi established by a witness who
testified that he observed the defendant in a restaurant approximately eight minutes after the crime was reported to police. He
further testified that it would take approximately ten minutes to
drive from the scene of the robbery to the restaurant. While this
testimony was uncontradicted, several members of the jury who
lived in the area in question informed their colleagues during
deliberations that the distance could be traversed in four minutes
at that time of night. Two of the jurors later conceded that this
which the direct statements of an accused made during a pre-Mirandainterrogation were introduced at his post-Miranda trial. If Miranda is applicable at all
to the fruits of statements made without proper warnings, I would limit its effect
to those cases in which the fruits were obtained as a result of post-Miranda
interrogations.
417 U.S. at 458 (citations omitted).
244. Id. at 460-61.
245. Id. at 461.
246. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
247. See TRIAL RIGHTS § 110.
248. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
249. 508 S.W.2d 67 (Tenn. 1974).
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information influenced them in reaching a verdict of guilty. The
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction
relying on an early decision 50° which condemned the consideration
of evidence coming from the jurors themselves. The Tennessee
Supreme Court reinstated the judgment of the trial court, finding
the principle employed by the lower court inapplicable when the
statements of the jurors related to a matter put in evidence. The
court concluded that "[j]urors are not bound to accept uncontradicted testimony if in the light of their common knowledge and
2' 5
experience they find such incredible. '
In Smith v. Rose252 it was alleged that during jury deliberation at the close of the defendant's trial, several jurors communicated with female inmates of the county jail, located across an
alley from the jury room. According to the petitioner, "these females treated the jurors to a 'strip-tease type' performance," and
the "jurors reciprocated by holding up papers, indicating the
numerical standing of the jury at various times and by sending
them cigarettes, chewing gum and candy."25' 3 The trial judge, in
a post-trial hearing, apparently found the allegations to be true,
except for the "scorecard" allegation, but concluded that the
events did not affect the fairness of the deliberation of the jury.
On petition for habeas corpus, the federal court found no reason
to disturb this factual determination.
H. Double Jeopardy
1. Trial De Novo
The implications of the protection against double jeopardy
for a trial de novo came before the United States Supreme Court
in Blackledge v. Perry. 54 Respondent had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in the district court division of the
General Court of Justice of North Carolina, which had exclusive
jurisdiction for the trial of misdemeanors. He received a sixmonth sentence and thereupon appealed to the appropriate superior court. State law granted an absolute right to a trial de novo
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Lee v. State, 121 Tenn. 521, 116 S.W. 881 (1908).
508 S.W.2d at 69.
382 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
Id. at 520.
417 U.S. 21 (1974).
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without allegations of error in the original proceeding. Thus,
when the appeal was taken, the prior conviction was annulled and
the prosecution began anew. After the respondent had filed the
notice of appeal, the prosecutor obtained an indictment from the
grand jury, charging the respondent with assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill resulting in infliction of serious bodily
injury. This offense was a felony though based on the same conduct which had resulted in the initial conviction for the misdemeanor. The respondent pled guilty and was sentenced to a term
of five to seven years in the penitentiary. Thereafter, he sought a
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the indictment on the felony
charge constituted double jeopardy and deprived him of due process of law. While acknowledging that the case was distinguishable from North Carolinav. Pearce,2' 5 in that the discretion of the
prosecutor rather than the judge or jury was at stake, the Court
concluded that the opportunity for vindictiveness was nonetheless equivalent,25 and that due process required a limitation comparable to the Pearce limitation against harsher sentencing on
retrial. The fact that the prosecutor did not act in bad faith in
seeking the indictment for the more serious offense was not
deemed significant. The concern of the Court in Pearce had been
that the "fear of such vindictiveness" would exert a chilling effect
on the decision to appeal or attack collaterally a conviction. 5
The Court in Blackledge thus concluded that it was constitutionally impermissible to bring a more serious charge against the
accused at a de novo trial.2 58 The Court excepted from its holding
255. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
256. A prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in discouraging convicted misdemeanants from appealing and thus obtaining a trial de novo in the
Superior Court, since such an appeal will clearly require increased expenditures
of prosecutorial resources before the defendant's conviction becomes final, and
may even result in a formally convicted defendant's going free. And, if the
prosecutor has the means readily at hand to discourage such appeals-by "upping the ante" through a felony indictment whenever a convicted misdemeanant
pursues his statutory appellate remedy-the State can insure that only the most
hardy defendants will brace the hazards of a de novo trial.
417 U.S. at 27-28.
257. We think it clear that the same consideration apply here. A person
convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo,
without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious
charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased
potential period of incarceration.
Id. at 28 (footnote and citation omitted).
258. See also Pettyjohn v. Evatt, 369 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Robinson v.
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the situation in which it had been impossible to bring the more
serious charge at the outset, as in Diaz v. United States.2 5 9 In that
case the accused had initially been charged with assault and
battery, but after conviction and before retrial the victim died,
giving rise to a homicide charge.
Although the original misdemeanor involved in Blackledge
constituted a lesser included offense of the felony subsequently
charged, the decision does not speak in terms of "lesser included
offenses." If the Court's holding is to be understood to preclude
the indictment of the accused for any more serious offense arising
out of the same transaction, then the holding of the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Bray v. State2 10 has been repudiated. That case
involved a situation substantially analogous to Blackledge except
that the original charge under a municipal ordinance was prowling, and a subsequent indictment was brought for breaking and
entering with intent to steal. Although the two charges arose out
of the same transaction, the former was not a lesser included
offense of the latter and the Supreme Court of Tennessee found
no double jeopardy problem.2 1 If, on the other hand, the
Blackledge holding is interpreted as being applicable only to situations involving lesser included offenses, there appears to be no
inconsistency with Bray. The second prosecution in Bray would
have been permissible even had the petitioner not elected to take
a de novo appeal from the first conviction. 212 Indeed, the petitioner was ultimately found guilty of both charges in Bray. This
would not have been possible in Blackledge since the situation
technically dealt with various degrees of the same statutory of26 3
fense.
In State v. Jackson,2 1 a Tennessee Supreme Court decision
Neil, 366 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). Both of these decisions anticipate the holding
in Blackledge.
259. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
260. 506 S.W.2d 772 (Tenn. 1974).
261. Both the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Tennessee prohibit any person from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same "offense", and to accept petitioner's insistence would for all practical effect require
rewriting both constitutions and substituting the word "episode" or "transaction" for the word "offense."
Id. at 774.
262. The court was not even sure that violating the prowling ordinance was a crime,
although that should not influence the result in any case.
263. See also Dombrowski v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1973).
264. 503 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. 1973).
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pre-dating but consistent with Blackledge, the court held unconstitutional a state statute265 affording both a juvenile and the
state a right to appeal to the circuit court for a trial de novo any
disposition of a child by a juvenile court. The court held the
statute violative of the protection against double jeopardy to the
extent that it authorized a trial de novo after an acquittal in the
juvenile court. Under the Blackledge holding imposing a constitutional limitation against bringing more serious charges following
a de novo appeal, there would appear to be no circumstances
under which the government could benefit by perfecting an appeal.
2.

Harsher Sentence Following Withdrawal of Guilty Plea

2
In North Carolina v. Pearce
1 the United States Supreme
Court precluded the imposition by a judge of a harsher sentence
on retrial, absent intervening events justifying a more severe punishment. The application of this doctrine to a trial following the
withdrawal of a guilty plea arose in Williams v. State,"7 a decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The defendant had pled
guilty to three separate indictments for selling marijuana and had
been sentenced to terms of one to three years on each charge, the
sentences to run concurrently. Thereafter, the defendant told a
parole investigator that he was not guilty of the offenses but had
entered the pleas in order to get a lighter sentence. Upon being
so informed, the trial judge conducted a hearing on the validity
of the pleas and permitted them to be withdrawn. The defendant
then went to trial, was convicted on all three charges, and received a sentence of one to three years on each charge, but this
time the sentences were ordered to run consecutively. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals had been concerned that the
three sales had occurred on the same day with the same purchaser
and that even if they were not part of a single transaction, to
permit consecutive sentences would encourage undercover agents
to make repetitious purchases in order to compound the charges.
The Tennessee Supreme Court was unimpressed by this argument, since the determination whether sentences should run con-

265.
266.
267.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-258 (Supp. 1974).
395 U.S. 711 (1969).
503 S.W.2d 109 (Tenn. 1973).
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currently or consecutively was by statute a question of discretion
for the trial judge."' 8 Where, as in Williams, re-sentencing is involved, however, a constitutional question arises under Pearce.
The court concluded that the Pearce holding was equally applicable to a trial following the withdrawal of the guilty plea and thus
that the imposition of the more severe punishment, absent intervening events justifying the harsher sentence, constituted error.

268.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2711 (1955).

